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We investigate peer ability effects on high powered test scores at ages 16 and 18, 
and on the probability of university attendance. To account for endogeneity in peer 
ability, we instrument average peer ability with the average ability of the primary 
school peers of one’s high school peers. Our results show that peers have a moder-
ately positive effect on test scores, and that being in a school with a large proportion 
of low-quality peers can have a significantly detrimental effect on achievements. Fur-
thermore, peer ability seems to have a stronger effect on students at the bottom of 
the grade distribution, especially at age 16. 
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The aim of the present paper is to investigate the relationship between peer ability and indi-
vidual attainment in high-stakes educational tests at the end of compulsory schooling at 
age 16 and at the end of high school at age 18, using a large, rich, and recent dataset of Eng-
lish teenagers. 
The analysis of peer effects in education has received increasing attention among 
economists and applied social scientists in recent years (see, for example, the recent review 
by Sacerdote, 2011). A number of studies (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Lavy et al., 2012; and 
Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015, among others) typically find statistically significant but modest 
peer effects on individual test scores. There is also evidence that heterogeneous peer effects 
exist. In particular, Burke and Sass (2013) and Ding and Lehrer (2007) find that high-ability 
students benefit from other high-ability students while Imberman et al. (2012) find that good 
peers have positive effects which are greatest for low-achieving students. Lavy et al. (2012) 
estimate a significantly negative effect from bad peers using British data, and positive effects 
from academically bright peers, but only for girls. 
 Establishing the presence and estimating the size of peer effects is important because 
they imply that educational interventions may have multiplier effects (Glaeser, Sacerdote, 
and Scheinkman 2003), i.e., that the impact of an educational intervention on an individual 
may self-propagate within a wider group of students. In addition, where there is heterogeneity 
in peer effects across the ability distribution, this provides a rationale for the efficient mixing 
of pupils in a school or in a classroom. An optimal student mix may raise the average attain-
ment of a group in ways which other educational interventions may not be able to achieve. 
 Identifying the effect of peer ability on individual achievements is particularly com-
plicated for several reasons pertaining to the endogeneity of the peer ability measure (Angrist, 
2014). Measures of peer ability are likely to be endogenous because of non-random sorting. 
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For example, children attending the same school are likely to have some common unobserved 
characteristics related to the area in which they live and their families’ socioeconomic back-
grounds. The correlation between these factors and both the educational outcomes and the 
nature of the peer group may lead to an overestimation of the effect of peer ability because of 
positive selection bias. Our strategy to estimate the effect of average peer ability is to instru-
ment it with average peer ability of the peers of students’ peers who have not shared an edu-
cational institution with those specific students. That is we exploit our ability to identify the 
peers of peers. 
 Moreover, individuals also affect their own peer group as much as the peer group af-
fects them (the so-called ‘reflection’ problem coined by Manski, 1993).1 As a result, peer 
achievements are not exogenous with respect to individual educational outcomes, especially 
when pupils have been exposed to each other for some years. Student learning is affected by 
direct classroom contact and more general social interaction, and individual achievements are 
likely to be correlated with those of other students in the same class or school. If this reflec-
tion issue is not taken into account, estimates of peer effects will be biased upwards. 
 We use information on the primary school peers of an individual’s high school peers 
who satisfy two conditions: first, they must have attended a different primary school from the 
student of interest; and, second, they must not be in the same high school as the student of 
interest. This information is used as an instrument for an individual’s average peer ability in 
high school. We believe our analysis is the first study to adopt this strategy of excluding 
peers of peers who have been one’s own peers, now or in the past. By instrumenting average 
                                                          
1 Manski (1993) distinguishes between the three non-exclusive channels through which individuals may have 
characteristics and outcomes similar to their peer group: via the endogenous effect, via exogenous effects (also 
called contextual effects), and via correlated effects. In our context, an endogenous effect arises if the 
individual’s achievement varies with the average achievement of the peer group; an exogenous effect arises if 
the individual’s achievement varies with the observable socioeconomic characteristics of the peer group; and 
correlated effects arise if the individual has similar achievements as her peers because they are subject to similar 
unobservables. 
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peer ability with the average outcome of the peers of one’s peers, i.e., those children who 
never shared the same school with the individual concerned, but who did share the same pri-
mary school as the individual’s current schoolmates, we overcome the reflection problem and 
mitigate the impact of selection bias. The exclusion restriction is based on the idea that these 
peers could never have had a direct effect on the student’s outcomes because they had never 
been in the same classroom or, indeed, the same school. While other studies have also used 
peers of peers as an identification strategy we believe our analysis is the first to be able to 
impose the constraint that the peers of peers could not generate reflection. 
 Much of the existing literature is based on large administrative datasets. Such data is 
usually not very rich – they typically contain rather few covariates.  For example, the existing 
literature in the UK mostly relies on the National Pupil Database (NPD), which has a very 
limited set of background characteristics that are typically thought of as important determi-
nants of academic outcomes. We use data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in 
England (LSYPE), which includes a wide variety of information on the child, the family, and 
the school. 
 When we exploit the richness of LSYPE and control for a much wider set of covari-
ates than previous studies, average peer ability has no significant impact on test scores at 
age 16, but it has some significant effects on performance at age 18 test scores. We do not 
find that that peers significantly affect the likelihood of attending university. The number of 
weak peers also has an effect on average outcomes at age 18, but not earlier. However, aver-
age peer ability seems to have a stronger beneficial effect on students at the bottom of the 
grade distribution, especially at age 16. Finally, when we analyse the effect of the presence of 
weak peers on age 16 test scores across the ability distribution, we find some evidence that 
the effect of weak peers is more detrimental to weak students than to stronger ones.  
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We contribute to the existing literature on peer effects in education in three main 
ways. First, we provide evidence based on this rich dataset of English teenagers, and we fo-
cus our attention on high-stakes educational outcomes at the end of high school at age 18. 
The existing literature based on British data mostly analyse the impact of peers on junior high 
school achievement at age 14 (Lavy et al., 2012; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015). Thus, our first 
contribution is that we show that the existing findings in the literature do not ‘fade’ – at least, 
they do not fade into statistical insignificance.  Second, we provide statistically significant 
evidence for the existence of heterogeneous peer effects across the grade distribution. Finally, 
we further contribute to the literature by introducing a novel identification strategy to over-
come the reflection problem as well as the biases resulting from unobserved heterogeneity 
and non-random sorting.  
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief over-
view of the existing literature. We present the data and explain the peer-ability indicators and 
outcomes in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss the estimation methods and the re-
sults, respectively. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of policy implications. 
2. Overview of the existing literature 
Researchers have been interested in the analysis of peer effects on a variety of outcomes, in-
cluding risky health behaviours (McVicar and Polanski, 2014; and Trogdon et al., 2008), and 
on a number of academic and educational outcomes (Zimmerman, 2003; Hanushek et al., 
2003; Carrell, 2009; Duflo et al., 2011; Lavy et al., 2012; and Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015). 
Most relevant to our work are those studies that analyse the effect of peer ability on educa-
tional achievements in school. Most studies have looked at low stakes outcomes for children 
in primary school environments and have exploited several different strategies to analyse the 
impact of peers in early ages (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Angrist and Lang, 
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2004; Lefgren, 2004; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2006; Vigdor and Nexhyba, 2007; and 
Goux and Maurin, 2007; Landini et al., 2016). 
 Hanushek et al. (2003) use data from the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (for 
students in grade three through to eight) and control for fixed school, individual, and school-
by-grade effects to show that peer achievements have a positive effect on individual grades, 
and that this effect is constant across quartiles of the grade distribution. Similarly, Lefgren 
(2004) uses data from Chicago public elementary schools and examine peer effects using 
school tracking policies. The author shows that peer effects are quite small but generally 
positive and significant. Angrist and Lang (2004) analyse the results of the METCO program 
in Boston, which sends black disadvantaged students to public primary schools in high-
socioeconomic-status areas, and they indicate that there is limited evidence of statistically 
significant effects.  
 A distinct strand of the literature examines peer effects in middle and secondary 
schools. Several studies show, mostly small but nonetheless often statistically significant, 
peer effects (e.g., Kang, 2007; Lavy et al., 2007; Schindler Rangvid, 2008; and Calvo-
Armengol et al., 2009). In the UK, Bradley and Taylor (2008) estimate peer effects using in-
formation on pupils changing schools in the last two years of their compulsory education. 
They show that peer effects exist and are stronger for low-ability students and non-white 
children. However, pupils who change schools may be systematically different from those 
who do not change, especially when the reasons for the change can be related to school 
achievements. In addition, Atkinson et al. (2008) use a panel of school children from the 
southwest of England to look at the effect of the introduction of teacher performance-related 
pay in England, and show significant and non-trivial peer effects while conditioning for 
school and teacher fixed effects. 
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 The studies that are closest to ours are Lavy et al. (2012) and Gibbons and Telhaj 
(2015). Both papers exploit the change in peers from primary to high school and use the Na-
tional Pupil Database (NPD) to analyse the effect of peer ability measured at the end of pri-
mary school through Key Stage 2 examinations (at age 11) and on achievements at the begin-
ning of high school, measured through Key Stage 3 exams (at age 14).2 Lavy et al. (2012) use 
within-pupil and cross-subject regressions, and exploit the variation in achievements by sub-
ject to show negative effects arising from bad peers. They estimate little effect of the average 
peer quality on the good peers. Gibbons and Telhaj (2015) exploit year-to-year changes in 
secondary school peer group, and account for fixed effects for both primary and high school 
attended. Their work shows small and significant peer effects as well as complementarities 
between peers with different ability levels. 
 These studies analyse the impact of peer ability at the beginning of high school (age 
14). Our work naturally complements them by estimating peer effects on high-stakes out-
comes at the end of high school and before entering tertiary education. Furthermore, both 
Lavy et al. (2012) and Gibbons and Telhaj (2015) use the Pupil Level Annual School Census 
(PLASC) and the National Pupil Database (NPD), which has a very limited set of family 
characteristics, and, in particular, do not include the detailed set of parental socioeconomic-
background variables which are available in LSYPE.3 Lastly, we believe our alternative iden-
tification strategy is also compelling since it relies on ‘peers of peers’ who never had any 
contact with the individual, thereby allowing us to account for both non-random sorting and 
the reflection problem. 
                                                          
2 Key Stages are discussed in more detail in Sec. 3.1. 
3 The only proxy for family income available in NPD is free school meal status eligibility. We tested our analy-
sis using this variable and have found that it does not capture the effect of other important variables, such as a 
local deprivation index, and parental education and employment. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Institutional background 
Education in England is organised in ‘Key Stages’ (KS). Children enter primary school at 4–
5 years old, and move to Key Stage 1 (at age 6–7). Key Stage 2 starts at age 7–8, and lasts 
until age 10–11 (Year 6) when children leave primary education and enter secondary school. 
At this point, Key Stage 3 starts (age 11–14), followed by Key Stage 4 (age 14–16). At the 
end of Key Stage 4, students take the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), 
which coincides with the end of compulsory schooling. 
 After this, students may decide to pursue further studies from age 16–18 (sometimes 
in a different school if their own school caters just for age 11–16, or otherwise in a ‘Sixth 
Form College’ that caters only for this older age group). In this Key Stage 5 (age 17–18), 
children specialise and study more challenging subjects in preparation for their General Cer-
tificate of Education (GCE) Advanced Level examinations (the so-called ‘A-levels’). Usually 
three or four subjects are studied at A-level over a two-year period, which are examined at 
the end of each year. Students usually select subjects that depend on their academic prefer-
ences and intentions toward further education. 
 Local Educational Authorities (LEA) are responsible for organising the admission 
policies for their primary and secondary schools.4 Publicly-funded schools cannot select stu-
dents on the basis of their ability, although some studies have suggested that schools find 
ways to select students on the basis of parental characteristics that might be correlated with 
ability (West and Hind, 2003). Our sample includes over 640 high schools and over 
82 percent of them are government ‘comprehensive’ schools, while voluntary-aided and con-
                                                          
4 Recent policy in England (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, who are not in LSYPE, have long had sepa-
rate control over the shape of their education systems) have led to a more diversified population of schools with 
the conversion of an increasing number of publically funded comprehensive secondary schools becoming 
‘Academy’ schools with greater independence from both central and local government control.  
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trolled schools (usually those schools with a religious denomination), who obtain the vast ma-
jority of their funding from the public purse, provide high school education for about 
15 percent of children. 
Children within a given area will often attend one of a small number of primary 
schools, and neighbouring children will often move on to one of several high schools.  Par-
ents are free to choose any secondary school they prefer, but when schools have a number of 
applicants which is higher than the available places, they allocate places according to some 
published criteria. Usually, looked-after children and children with special needs have priori-
ty, followed by children who have siblings in the same school, and then children living in the 
area, with proximity used as the tie-breaker.  
 In secondary schools, students are often grouped with different peers for different 
subjects, so they do not have a unique ‘class’ for all subjects. Furthermore, students are some-
times taught in groups of similar ability (determined after an initial observation period) for 
some subjects, although not all schools ‘set’ by ability, and this varies by subject, with a 
higher prevalence of ability setting for Mathematics and Science and a lower incidence for 
English (Kutnick et al., 2006). Indeed, some GCSE examinations, at age 16, are organised in 
‘tiers’, whereby different students sit a different test depending on their ability group, so that 
the maximum grade that they can achieve depends on their allocated tier. As noted in Lavy et 
al. (2012), a high level of ability setting might affect measures of peer quality and might lead 
to downward bias in estimates of peer effects. However, our identification strategy relies on 
peers of peers’ ability in primary schools, where a low degree of ability setting is expected.  
3.2 Dataset 
The LSYPE dataset is managed by the UK Department of Education and covers a wide range 
of topics, including family relationships, attitudes toward school, family and labour market, 
and some more sensitive or challenging issues, such as risky health behaviours, and personal 
relationships. Young people included in LSYPE were selected to be representative of all 
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young people in England but, at the same time, the survey oversampled specific groups (and, 
in particular, young people from a low socioeconomic background). The survey started when 
these adolescents were in Year 9 in 2004 at the age of 14. In the first wave of LSYPE, around 
15,000 young people were interviewed across more than 700 high schools. On average, data 
were collected for 27 students in each school. In the first four waves, parents (or guardians) 
were also interviewed. 
 The records of LSYPE children can be linked to the NPD, a pupil-level administrative 
database of all English pupils including detailed information on pupil test scores and 
achievements, as well as school characteristics. We use this data to collect information about 
LSYPE children’s results in test scores at ages 11, 14, and 16, which is the minimum school-
leaving age for this cohort. This occurs at the end of a stage of Key Stage 4, and culminates 
in the GCSEs exams. LSYPE also includes information on Key Stage 5 exams, with detailed 
grades by subject studied. Beyond this, the LSYPE dataset records intention to participate in 
higher education at a university and actual attendance. 
Our final sample includes 9,213 observations of children with non-missing information 
on test scores at ages 11, 14 and 16, peer test scores, and other essential information on the 
child’s family background, coming from 640 high schools and 4,126 primary schools. When 
we estimate the impact of peers’ ability on test scores at age 17-18, the sample becomes 
smaller because we only include individuals who remain in education at age 17 (Wave 4 of 
LSYPE). The selected observations were not significantly different from the original data in 
terms of their observable characteristics. 
3.3      Outcomes 
Our interest is in analysing the effect of peer ability on academic outcomes at the end of high 
school and on the chances that a young person will take further studies after compulsory edu-
cation. We analyse peer effects on GCSE examinations score performance at age 15–16, A-
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level attainments (at age 17–18), the likelihood of attending university, and of being admitted 
to a prestigious institution. 
 Our dependent variables include the number of subjects with ‘pass’ grades (A*–C) in 
GCSE exams; and a binary variable equal to 1 if the child has five GCSE passes including 
Mathematics and English, which is the ‘gold standard’ that is usually required for students to 
follow an academic track for progression beyond 16 into senior high school and beyond. Ta-
ble 1, which provides the descriptive statistics for our outcome variables, shows that more 
than half of the adolescents in the sample achieved five or more GCSE exams with a passing 
grade between A* and C, and 42 percent take A-level examinations two years later. Of those 
who stay in education after 16, 35 percent attend university and, within this subsample, 
23 percent attend an institution that is part of the Russell Group of institutions that is regarded 
as being elite.5 Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the number of GCSEs obtained at 
passing grades, and cumulated A-level points scores, respectively.6 
 We also explore the impact of peer ability on student performance in Mathematics 
and Science at A-levels. As noted in Mendolia and Walker (2014), the determinants of per-
formance in a particular subject are very hard to disentangle from overall school perfor-
mance. It is particularly interesting to analyse peer effects in performance in these STEM 
(Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) subjects, as the UK ranking of 15-year-old 
pupils in Mathematics and Science in the OECD’s PISA tests has been consistently falling 
from 2000 to 2009. Furthermore, the UK has one of the lowest shares of 15-year olds intend-
                                                          
5 The Russell Group consists of the following 24 institutions: Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, 
Durham, Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Imperial College, King's College London, Leeds, Liverpool, London 
Scholl of Economics, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Queen Mary College London, Queen’s 
Belfast,  Sheffield, Southampton, University College London, Warwick, and York. 
6 The LSYPE data accurately reflect the population average numbers of passes at GCSE (approximately 60 
percent in this cohort), and the distribution of A-levels, where around 10 percent of an A-level cohort would 
achieve 4 (and sometimes more) straight A’s . The note to Table 1 explains how A-level grades in each subject 
are converted to points and aggregated. 
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ing to pursue a STEM career among the OECD countries, and particularly lags behind in 
women’s aspirations to study a STEM subject and engage in a STEM career (OECD, 2012). 
Finally, we analyse the effect of peer ability on the probability of being enrolled at 
university at age 19–20 (close to 30 percent of an age cohort), and on the probability of at-
tending a Russel Group institution (which is close to 25 percent of all university entrants). 
3.4 Other independent variables 
We exploit the richness of the LSYPE data and estimate three versions of our model, progres-
sively expanding the set of covariates. Below, we present estimates for a model which con-
trols for a basic set of individual and family characteristics, including child’s sex and 
achievement in the KS2 test (age 11); maternal education and marital status; employment sta-
tus of both parents (Wave 4 – age 17); and, additionally, the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD) score, which is a measure derived from area level income, employment, health and 
disability, education, housing, crime, and living environment.7 Table 2 records the descriptive 
statistics for a number of the independent variables included in the analysis. 
We also estimate results which exclude the IMD score; and results which extend the con-
trols to embrace individual ethnic background and for some school characteristics, such as 
government region, number of students, religious denomination, and the gender mix of the 
school. These results are presented in the Appendix. 
3.5       Peer ability 
The principal explanatory variable, average peer ability, is measured through achievements in 
KS3 tests (age 14) for children who attended the same high school of each LSYPE child. Our 
                                                          
7 In the Appendix, we present results which exclude this latter variable; and results which extend the controls to 
embrace individual ethnic background and for some school characteristics, such as government region, number 
of students, religious denomination, and the gender mix of the school. 
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instrumental variable, the average peers-of-peers ability, is measured through achievements 
in KS2 tests taken at the end of primary school at age 10. 
 We investigate the effect of low-achieving peers in high school in order to analyse 
whether a large fraction of ‘bad peers’ is detrimental to student learning. To do so, we use the 
information on the percentage of students not achieving the basic standard (called Level 5) in 
KS3 Mathematics. Figure 3 presents the distribution of this variable. The majority of schools 
in the estimation sample have a percentage of students not achieving basic standards in Maths 
below 30 percent and, as expected, there are very few schools where more than 50 percent of 
students are in this category. 
Our analysis is limited to children who are in LSYPE, and, consequently, we do not 
have a complete overview of all students in a particular primary or high school, and our esti-
mates could potentially be affected by measurement error for this reason. However, the 
LSYPE sample was designed to be representative of various subgroups of the student popula-
tion in England, and using students in LSYPE allows us to access to all the available infor-
mation on their families and backgrounds, which are not included in NPD but could be rele-
vant in explaining academic outcomes. 
 On average, LSYPE children have a high school peer group of 15 students (in 
LSYPE) who come from many different primary schools (from two to 23 primary schools). 
The vast majority of high schools (around 80 percent) draw their students from a group of 8 
to 14 primary schools. Table 3 shows that over 70 percent of children have a peers-of-peers 
group that contains three or more students. In our sample, the size of the peers-of-peers group 
varies from one to 97 children. 
4 Estimation 
We begin our analysis by estimating a linear-in-means model of peer effects: 
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 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑝 = ?̅?𝑖ℎ𝛼 + 𝐗𝑖′𝛄 + 𝜖𝑖, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑝 represents a particular academic outcome for individual 𝑖 who is attending high 
school ℎ and who attended primary school 𝑝. We define 𝑖’s high school peers as those cur-
rently attend high school ℎ, and they could have attended a variety of primary schools apart 
from school 𝑝. The variable ?̅?𝑖ℎ is the average ability (measured by KS3 score) for LSYPE 
children attending high school ℎ excluding the individual (the ‘leave-one-out’ mean), and 𝐗𝑖 
is a vector of child and family characteristics and a constant, the inclusion of which would 
likely increase the precision of the OLS estimator while simultaneously reducing the impact 
of potential selection bias. 
The parameter of interest is 𝛼, which captures the relationship between average peer 
ability, ?̅?𝑖ℎ, and individual achievements, 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑝, at the end of junior high school and beyond. 
This represents the endogenous effect in the terminology of Manski (1993) and, if significant, 
it is this that generates the social multiplier effect. 
To account for the endogeneity of average peer ability in Equation (1), we use instru-
mental-variable estimation, with peers-of-peers ability in primary school (measured as KS2 
achievements – age 11) as an instrument for the average high school peer ability (measured 
as KS3 achievements – age 14). Our first-stage equation is 
 ?̅?𝑖ℎ = 𝐵�𝑧𝑧𝛽 + 𝐗𝑖′𝛑 + 𝜈𝑖, (2) 
where the average high school peer ability ?̅?𝑖ℎ depends on the peers-of-peers average per-
formance 𝐵�𝑧𝑧 in primary school of those who attended primary schools 𝑧, where 𝑧 ≠ 𝑝, and 
currently attending high school 𝑡, where 𝑡 ≠ ℎ. 
 The exclusion restriction essentially states that the ability of the high school students’ 
peers-of-peers in primary school did not affect the high schools’ student achievements direct-
ly except through its impact on the student’s current peers in high school. Note that there is 
no reason for our measure of ability to be restricted to KS3 performance because not only 
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have individuals in our sample never met their peers of peers in primary school, these peers-
of-peers children have also gone to different high schools. Therefore, the reflection problem 
does not arise. We also present results throughout which, instead, we measure peer ability 
using peers’ KS2 and GCSE instrumented by their peers of peers score at KS2 level. 
 One natural concern in the estimation of this model is that selection of secondary 
schools on the basis of unobservable characteristics could be driving the main findings. Par-
ents choose the school for their children (or at least the area where they live) and, thus, indi-
viduals who attend the same high school are likely to have some common background char-
acteristics. Our instrument relies on peers of peers who do not attend the same high school as 
the individual and did not attend the same primary school. Around 80 percent of high schools 
in the estimation sample have more than eight primary feeder schools, and, therefore, the 
peers of peers (who now attend a different high school) are likely to have come from an area 
with different socioeconomic characteristics. Therefore, given the considerable number of 
primary and high schools in the data, there is no reason to believe that these differences are 
systematic and peers of peers are a selected group.8 
As noted in Gibbons et al. (2013), most households can choose between more than 
one school from their area of residence and, on average, students in the same cohort living in 
the same neighbourhood attend just one of a handful of different local secondary schools. 
Furthermore, a typical English secondary school is attended by pupils living in more than 60 
Output Areas, the smallest proxy for neighbourhood (Gibbons et al., 2013). However, neigh-
bourhood composition has a very limited effect on test scores once one controls for family 
                                                          
8 We might expect the peers of peers to be more likely to have correlated effects with the high school peers in 
the data the fewer the high schools are typically attended in a given area. For example, this might be the case 
with rural schools where choices may be geographically limited. It may also be the case in large high schools. 
We show that our headline results are robust to differentiating between rural and urban high schools, and those 
coming from small or large high schools (where small high schools are defined as those with less than 1000 
students, which is about the median high school size in our data). 
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socioeconomic characteristics (Gibbons et al., 2013), and we believe that our rich data allow 
us to take into consideration a wide set of these factors. 
 Thus far, we have assumed that peer effects are homogeneous in the sense that the 
relationship between peer ability and individual achievements is the same for each student. 
However, peer effects are likely to be heterogeneous and vary according to the individual 
ability of students. For example, peer ability might have stronger effects on weak students 
than on strong students or vice versa; or the presence of a group of weak students might have 
different effects on weak students than on strong ones (see, e.g., Kong 2007). 
 We use quantile regression to examine the potential heterogeneous effects of peer 
ability at different points of the achievement distributions. We estimate the effect of the aver-
age peer ability for students at different quantiles of the GCSE and A-level score distribu-
tions. In order to deal with the endogeneity of peer ability in high school, we use IV quantile 
regression (Chernozhukov et al., 2010; Chernozhukov et al., 2015; Lee, 2007) which has 
been used in a similar context in Kong (2007).9 
 A parametric version of the estimator proposed by Lee (2007) is used in the estima-
tion. In particular, following Lee (2007), the following model is estimated: 
 𝑄𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑝|𝐴,𝐗 = ?̅?ℎ𝛼 + 𝐗𝑖
′𝛄 + 𝜀𝑖, (3) 
where 𝑄𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑝|𝐴,𝐗 is the quantile distribution of 𝑌. The first-step linear quantile regression is 
modelled as 
 𝑄?̅?ℎ|𝑍 = 𝐵�𝑧𝑧𝛽 + 𝐗𝑖
′𝛑 + 𝜈𝑗, (4) 
 
where 𝑄?̅?ℎ|𝑍 is the quantile distribution of peer ability ?̅?ℎ, and  𝛽 and 𝛑 can be estimated by a  
quantile regression of 𝑌 on ?̅? and 𝑍. 
                                                          
9 The analysis is performed using the Stata routine cqiv with the uncensored option (Chernozhukov et al., 2011). 
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 Furthermore, we follow Lavy et al. (2012) and estimate the effect of having low-
ability peers in high school. To do so, we use the information on the percentage of students 
not achieving the basic standard (called Level 5) in KS3 (or KS2) Mathematics, which is 
available in the LSYPE dataset for each high school. In order to deal with the potential en-
dogeneity of this variable, we apply the same strategy as in the previous model and instru-
ment it with a variable indicating the percentage of students not achieving basic standards in 
KS2 Mathematics in peers-of-peers primary schools. 
5 Results 
The main results are presented in Table 4, where the regressions control for individual and 
family characteristics, including the Index of Multiple Deprivation score. Each row is sepa-
rate outcome variable; adjacent columns compares OLS and IV; the three super columns refer 
to different ways of measuring peer ability – peers KS2 age 10 score, or their KS3 age 14 
score, or the number GCSE passes at age 16.10  
Despite the long vector of control variables, the results from least-squares estimation 
are still likely to be biased estimates of the true peer effect. It could be biased upward because 
peers are endogenous, but it could also be biased downward because we measure peer per-
formance with error. Our information on peers is limited to students being in the same school, 
but we cannot actually observe whether two pupils have had direct interaction with each oth-
er. Moreover, we are measuring the average performance of peers using a subsample of indi-
viduals who are in the same high school, but went to a different primary school, and are also 
interviewed in LSYPE. Thus, our average measure of peer ability is likely to have more 
                                                          
10 Results for less and more parsimonious specifications are provides in the Appendix, Tables A4 and A5. It is 
important to show the stability of our main results when controlling for the IMD variable, as it is well-known 
that family socioeconomic status is a strong predictor of educational achievements later in life. The Appendix 
results show similar patterns as Table 4. We also tested our main results by including an additional indicator of 
economic disadvantage of the primary school attended (percentage of students eligible for free school meal). 
The substantive results were unaffected. First-stage regression results from 2SLS are presented in the Appendix 
as well (Table A6). 
17 
measurement error than is usually the case when all peers are included in the data. Therefore, 
we cannot a priori sign the direction of bias in OLS. 
 Unsurprisingly, the OLS results presented in Table 4 are consistently highly signifi-
cant and suggest that improving peer ability has a positive effect on individual achievements 
at age 16–17 (GCSE exams) and at age 17–18 (A-level exams); and the sizes of the effect are 
nontrivial. For example, a one standard deviation increase in average peer KS3 score increas-
es an individual’s chances of having five or more GCSE with A*–C by 4.5 percent (and the 
mean of this variable is 52 percent). 
 A number of statistically significant coefficients lose their significance once we ac-
count for potential endogeneity with IV estimation. However, the OLS results for perfor-
mance in test scores at age 17–18 (A-levels) carry over into IV, although most of the estimat-
ed coefficients are now larger, which suggests that there could be substantial attenuation bias 
in OLS estimation due to measurement error. Interestingly, when we use IV estimation, we 
do not find any significant effect of peer ability on the chances of attending university, nor to 
gaining admission to an elite higher education institution.  
 The IV results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the average KS3 score 
of the peers increases the probability of taking A-levels by about 13 percent (the average of 
this variable is 42 percent in the estimation sample); and the effect on average A-level score 
increases by 39.815 points, which is equivalent to 28 percent of a standard deviation. Peer 
ability also significantly increases performance in A-level Mathematics by 21.35 points 
(38 percent of a standard deviation). These results are broadly consistent in terms of size and 
significance whether use peer KS2, KS3 or GSCE as the measure of average peer ability. 
 Table 5 presents estimation results for the effect of having low-achieving peers. Each 
row is a different outcome, and again we compare OLS and IV results across columns; and 
we measure peer ability by KS2 and KS3 scores.  The IV results indicate that being in a 
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school with a 10-percent larger proportion of peers who do not achieve basic standards in 
Mathematics significantly decreases performance in test scores at age 14 (KS3) by about 0.20 
to 0.30 points (equivalent to 3 to 5 percent of a standard deviation). While low-quality peers 
do not seem to affect GCSE performance, the results suggest that they do decrease A-level 
results (–14 to –18 points or 10–13 percent of a standard deviation), as well as the probability 
of taking A-levels in Maths and Sciences and results in A-level Maths.11 These results are 
similar to the corresponding effect in Lavy et al. (2012), who show that a 10-percent decrease 
in the proportion of ‘bad’ peers at school is associated with an improvement of approximately 
10–11 percent of a standard deviation of the within-pupil KS3 distribution for students. 
 Both Tables 4 and 5 suggest that peer ability does not significantly affect performance 
at GCSE level (age 16–17). However, this could simply be due to the fact that the effect of 
peer ability on individual achievements is heterogeneous, i.e., that peer ability matters a lot 
for students at a particular point of the grade distribution, and very little for others. For exam-
ple, it is possible that some students suffer (or benefit) more from their peers’ ability and in 
particular, it is possible that weaker students are more heavily influenced by their peers’ be-
haviour and achievements in class. For this reason, we follow Kang (2007) and use quantile 
regressions in order to analyse the potential heterogeneity of peer interactions. 
 Results from the estimation using quantile regression are summarised in Table 6, and 
in Figures 4 and 5, using the benchmark specification where average peer KS3 performance 
is used as a measure of peer ability. Our results confirm the main findings in the previous lit-
erature (e.g., Kang, 2007 and Carrell et al., 2009), which indicate that peer effects are strong-
er at the bottom of the grade distribution. For example, Figure 4 shows that a one-standard-
deviation increase in average peer KS3 score increases the number of GCSEs with Grades 
                                                          
11 We explore the sensitivity of these results to school size and urban/rural in the Appendix (see Tables A1 and 
A2) which shows that small and large schools have insignificantly different IV results (although the F-statistic 
indicates a weakness in the instrument in the case of large schools), as do urban and rural schools. 
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A*–C by about 0.75 for students in the 20th quantile while the effect vanishes for students in 
the top half of the grade distribution. Similarly, Figure 5 shows that increased peer ability 
improve the score in A level exams by over 50 points for students in the bottom quintile of 
the grade distribution, while the effect is much smaller for students at the top. 
 Results from the estimation of quantile regression on the effect of low-ability peers 
are presented in Figure 6 and 7 and strongly confirm that increasing the percentage of low-
ability peers is significantly detrimental for students at the bottom of the GCSE grade distri-
bution. 10 percent more high school peers who do not achieve basic standards in Mathemat-
ics decrease the number of GCSEs at passing A*–C grades by about 0.3 for students in the 
20th percentile of the grade distribution, while the effect is significantly smaller and then van-
ishes for top students. Figure 7 shows effects of low-quality peers on A-level points which 
are generally negative. A 10-percent increase in the proportion of peers who do not achieve 
basic standards in Mathematics has a negative effect that ranges from 19 (10th percentile of 
A-level distribution) to 12 points (80th percentile) in the individual A-level score. 
 The potential endogeneity of peer ability is taken into account using quantile instru-
mental variable regression, and the results are presented in Tables 7–10.12 Average peer ef-
fects are generally insignificant across the GCSE distribution. In the case of the effect of low-
quality peers, the results presented in Table 8 suggest that the effect of low-quality peers on 
GCSE results is especially relevant at the bottom of the distribution. The results also confirm 
that peer effects on A-level performance are significant across the grade distribution, espe-
cially when we look at the impact of low-quality peers in Table 10. 
 This difference with respect to GCSE results might be partially due to the fact that 
students who undertake A-levels will usually study in a different school (often a Sixth Form 
                                                          
12 We estimate this model using the Stata user-written cqiv command with the uncensored option 
(Chernozhukov et al., 2012). 
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College) from the one they attended in the junior high years, so this model is actually estimat-
ing the effect of ‘past peers’, as we rely on peers at the beginning of junior high school. Fur-
thermore, A-level exams require a higher level of preparation than GCSEs, and it is possible 
that the quality of high school peers has a stronger effect on the students’ preparation at this 
higher level. 
 We test our main results using three sensitivity analyses. First, we re-estimate the 
model comparing schools with less than 1000 students to those with more than 1000 students 
enrolled.13 Large schools will typically draw from a larger number of junior schools and are 
more likely to implement setting by ability groups in some subjects. For this reason, we ex-
pect peer effects to be stronger in small schools, where there are a limited number of peers 
with which to interact. Similarly, Lavy et al. (2012) address the ability-tracking problem by 
restricting their estimation to the smallest 50 percent of secondary schools in England. The 
results are fairly similar across different school sizes with respect to the impact of low-quality 
peers, and do indeed seem stronger in small schools, especially when we look at the impact 
on the performance in A-level in Mathematics (see Appendix Table A1). 
 Second, we re-estimate results comparing high schools that are in regions that are 
largely rural with high schools in urban areas.14 In rural areas, school choice is likely to be 
limited, and the student population is more likely to be homogeneous. Peer effects from low-
quality peers are very similar across the two sub-samples, but the effect from average peer 
quality is stronger in non-rural schools (see Appendix Table A2). 
                                                          
13 We also re-estimate the model limiting the sample to students who have at least ten peers from the same high 
school in LSYPE. The substantive results are unchanged. 
14 We adopt  the definition of rural areas used in the Family Resource Survey data. The complete list of rural 
areas is Berkshire, Bournemouth, Dorset and Poole, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire and Warrington, County 
Durham, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, 
Herefordshire and Worcestershire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Kent and Medway, Lancashire, Leicestershire, 
Lincolnshire and Rutland, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Northumberland, Shropshire, Somerset, Staffordshire, Suf-
folk, Sussex, West Yorkshire, West of England, Wiltshire and Swindon. 
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 As a final sensitivity test, we estimate a model with primary-school fixed effects in 
order to take into consideration the common unobserved characteristics of children who at-
tended the same primary school (see Appendix Table A3). Unfortunately, our data do not al-
low estimating a model with high-school fixed effects, as we only have one observation of 
average peer KS3 score for all children attending the same high school, and this would be 
perfectly collinear with the fixed effect. The results are consistent with the previous findings 
from the OLS and IV estimates. Interestingly, in the fixed-effects model, peer ability has a 
significant effect on the probability of attending university.15 
6.      Conclusion 
We estimated the effect of peer ability in English high schools using data from the Longitu-
dinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE). As a measure of peer ability, we used 
primarily the pupil’s Key Stage 2 test score at age 10. While we focused our attention on the 
effect of average peer ability, we also considered the effect of being in a school with a high 
proportion of low-achieving peers. Moreover, we have investigated the effect of peer ability 
across the grade distribution using quantile-regression methods. 
 The main contributions of the work are that we analyse peer effects on high-stakes 
outcomes at the end of high school using a very rich and recent dataset. We also propose and 
use a novel identification strategy based on the peers of peers who have had no direct interac-
tion with the student of interest. These peers of peers are primary school peers of an individu-
al’s high school peers who attended both different primary and high schools from the indi-
vidual, and we use information pertaining to them as an instrument for high school average 
peer ability. The maintained assumption is that, since these peers of peers have never been in 
                                                          
15 The results for other independent variables are reported in Appendix Table A7. Not surprisingly, individual 
ability (measured through the KS2 score) and family socioeconomic status (and, in particular, maternal 
education) are strong determinant of academic achievements. 
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school with the individual, they could never have had a direct effect on her or his achieve-
ments. 
 Our findings show that average peer ability has a moderate effect on performance in 
GCSE exams at age 16, and most of the effect is found for students at the bottom of the grade 
distribution. In particular, being in a school with a high proportion of low-achieving peers is 
particularly detrimental for the achievements of students in the bottom quartile of the GCSE 
distribution. 
 Results for A-levels are less heterogeneous and show that increased peer quality is 
significantly beneficial for all students across the grade distribution. Our results are stable to 
the introduction of a more detailed set of independent variables, including individual, family 
and school characteristics, and robust as well to IV regression and primary-school fixed ef-
fects. Our results are broadly consistent with previous findings from the literature and in par-
ticular with Gibbons and Telhaj (2015) and Lavy et al. (2012). 
  Our results imply that there are some indications of complementarities between stu-
dents of different abilities. Even if it is particularly complex to draw clear policy implications 
related to students’ ability mixing, we believe that these results show the detrimental effect of 
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Table 1      Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables 
Educational Outcomes Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Key Stage 3 Score 34.661 (6.42) 
Has 5 or more GCSE with A*–C incl. English and Maths 52.34% 
Number of GCSEs with A*–C 6.46 (4.17) 
Has A levels 42.30% 
A-levels points  | Has A levels 242.56 (137.43) 
Has A level in Maths 9% 
A-level points in Maths | A level in Maths 113.8 (53.88) 
Has A level in Science  12% 
A-level points in Science | A level in Science 134.22 (75.36) 
Attending university 29.8% 
Attending a Russell Group university | conditional on attending university 23% 











































Table 2  Descriptive Statistics of independent variables 
Variable Mean (Stand. Dev) 
Key Stage 2 Score   27.341(3.93) 
IMD score 24.273 (17.44) 
Male 0.504 
Maternal age 44.952 (5.44) 
Maternal education  
        Degree 0.112 
        HE below degree level 0.135 
        A-level 0.128 
        GCSE A*-C 0.279 
        Below GCSE 0.337 
Marital status  
        Mother is married 0.758 
        Mother is divorced 0.131 
        Mother is widow 0.018 
Maternal employment status  
        Mother is employed or self-employed 0.762 
        Mother is unemployed 0.017 























Table 3      Peer of Peers Group Size 
Number of Peers Percent of LSYPE Children 
1 peer of peers 10 
2 peers of peers 18 
3–4 peers of peers 10 
5–7 peers of peers 10 
8–10 peers of peers 12 
 11–15 peers of peers 12 





































Table 4 OLS and IV Estimates of the Impact of Average Peers’ Quality on Academic Achievement 
 
 Effect of peers’ KS2 Effect of peers’ KS3 Effect of peers’ GCSE 











20.53 n.a n.a n.a 
N 9,213 7,997  9,213 9,213     
























































































































































































  -0.092 
(0.073) 
5,545 



































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables included are listed 
at p.14-15. Sample size, N,  is different between IV and OLS because all students whose peers come from 1 primary school only do not have “peers of peers” and 




Table 5 OLS and IV estimates of the impact of % of students not achieving basic standards in 
Mathematics on academic achievements 
 Effect at KS21 level  Effect at KS32 level 


































































































































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables 
included are listed at p.14-15. IV Sample size, N, is different between IV and OLS because all students whose peers come from 1 primary school 
only do not have “peers of peers and are excluded. F is the Stock and Yogo test that suggests that, as a rule of thumb, one might consider 
instruments that result in an F below 10 as weak. 
                                                          
1 Effect of a 10% increase in the percentage of students who did not achieve basic standards in Mathematics in KS2 (age 11) in the primary school of the 
individual’s high school peers. 
2 Effect of a 10% increase in the percentage of students who did not achieve basic standards in Mathematics in KS3 (age 14) in the individual’s high school. 
32 
Table 6  Quantile Regression of the impact of peers’ quality on GCSE passes 
 Effect of peers’ KS3 on # GCSE A*-C Effect of peers’ KS3 on A level points 
Percentile Average peers  
quality 
% Low quality peers Average peers  
quality 

























































P80   -0.041 
(0.104) 
  -0.008 
(0.037) 
  31.785 
(4.090)*** 
  -11.900 
(2.579)*** 






  -10.235 
(2.040)*** 
N 9,213 9,168 3,948 3,900 
Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables 
included are listed at p.14-15. 
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P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 
_b 0.668 1.613 0.234 0.189 0.092 0.435 -0.111 -0.114 0.435 
Mean 0.842 1.458 0.494 0.309 0.029 0.454 -0.003 -0.272 0.454 
Lower bound -0.432 -0.203 -0.687 -0.692 -0.792 -0.376 -1.039 -1.133 -0.376 
Upper bound 2.366 3.171 1.666 1.338 0.870 1.379 0.996 0.681 1.379 
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap 
replications. 
 
Table 8  IV Quantile Regression of the impact of % low ability peers on GCSE passes (Effect of peers’KS3) 
 
# GCSE A*–C P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 
_b -0.441 -0.443 -0.210 -0.184 -0.151 -0.347 -0.252 -0.088 -1.448 
Mean -0.420 -0.384 -0.238 -0.212 -0.170 -0.321 -0.256 -0.087 -1.164 
Lower bound -0.646 -0.629 -0.531 -0.431 -0.423 -0.538 -0.426 -0.287 -3.122 
Upper bound -0.087 -0.092 0.060 0.095 0.069 -0.088 0.016 0.170 0.593 





Table 9 IV Quantile Regression of the impact of average peers’ quality on A level points – Effect of peers’ KS3 
A level points P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90  
_b 46.92728 37.61557 4.898 4.898241 5.62693 14.66731 40.002 32.643 11.752  
Mean 51.33338 35.56376 18.618 18.61795 12.12015 21.97272 49.004 37.477 44.712  
Lower bound -16.7845 -38.9555 -30.743 -30.7431 -57.7063 -41.402 11.234 -19.417 -13.628  
Upper bound 112.7472 120.8973 85.156 85.15649 87.29702 84.02908 97.631 99.380 138.942  
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap 
replications. 
 
Table 10 IV Quantile Regression of the impact of % low quality peers on A level results– Effect of peers’ KS3 
A level points P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 
_b -10.2379 -13.4252 -19.182 -20.487 -20.3744 -25.7201 -20.9793 -15.924 -15.515 
Mean -10.2687 -13.9594 -18.745 -20.7811 -23.0012 -25.1854 -21.4499 -18.254 -19.033 
Lower bound -28.5673 -26.4512 -34.772 -37.2917 -40.5129 -41.2162 -36.8531 -34.526 -37.214 
Upper bound 8.389135 1.492725 -4.763 -6.75027 -7.59995 -11.0534 -8.77824 2.472 -0.514 




Figure 1     Distribution of Number of GCSEs with Grade A*–C 
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Figure 3 Distribution of Percentage of Students Not Achieving Basic Standard 
Mathematics 
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Figure 5 Estimated effects of average KS3 peers’ score across deciles of A-level points 
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Table A1 Sensitivity to compare students from small and big high schools (<1000 and >1000 students) Model 2 
 
 Average peers quality % Low quality peers  
 Small schools Big schools Small schools Big schools 
























  29.053 
(22.173) 






  -19.492 
(9.946)** 
19.74   -15.63 
(2.610)*** 











































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables 




Table A2 Sensitivity to compare students from rural and non-rural areas 
 
 Average peers quality % Low quality peers  
 Rural schools Non rural schools Rural schools Non rural schools 




























  44.395 
(22.855)** 

















































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables 




Table A3 Primary school fixed effects estimates of the effect of peers’ ability on academic achievements  
Outcomes Average peers quality % Low quality peers  
# GCSE A*–C  -0.032 (0.153) -0.176 (0.063)***  
5+ GCSE A*–C 0.00096 (0.021) -0.017 (0.008)**  
Having A levels 0.065 (0.027)*** -0.041 (0.011)***  
A levels Points 34.051 (11.293)*** -23.284 (5.102)***  
Having A levels in Maths 0.045 (0.039)   -0.039 (0.017)***  
A level points in Maths    7.484 (4.687)   -5.530 (2.099)***  
Having A levels in Science 0.084 (0.042)** -0.045 (0.019)***  
A level points in Science   13.130 (6.605)**   -6.149 (2.970)**  
Attended University  0.0612 (0.032)* -0.045 (0.013)***  
Russell University -0.046 (0.056) -0.0052 (0.026)  
Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables 
included are listed at p.14-15. 
All models include primary schools FE (at KS2 level). Models with A levels as main outcomes control from GCSE past performance and models 
with university outcomes control for A levels. 
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Table A4 –Results from alternative (more parsimonious) model – Impact of average peers’ ability (Key Stage 3 score) 
 Effect of peers’ average KS3 Effect of % low ability peers 
Outcomes OLS IV OLS IV 
KS3 points  1.473 (0.089)*** 1.410 (0.425)***   -0.495 (0.041)*** -0.415 (0.104)** 
# GCSE  
A*–C  
0.327 (0.099)*** 0.576 (0.539)*** -0.107 (0.041)*** -0.190 (0.115)* 
5+ GCSE  
A*–C 
0.057 (0.012)*** 0.134 (0.058)*** -0.018(0.005)***    -0.029 (0.012)*** 
Having  
A levels 
0.069 (0.011)*** 0.147 (0.060)**   -0.024 (0.005)*** -0.028 (0.014)*** 
A-level  
Points 
42.912 (3.773)*** 43.962 (19.024)**   -16.500 (1.727)*** -17.723 (4.849)*** 
A levels in 
Maths 
0.055 (0.015)*** 0.104 (0.070)   -0.016 (0.006)*** -0.0313 (0.016)* 
A level points in 
Maths 
9.249 (2.076)*** 18.874 (8.158)** -2.899 (0.767)*** -4.648 (2.045)*** 
A levels in 
Science 
0.067 (0.015)*** 0.048 (0.067) -0.0261 (0.006)*** -0.036 (0.017)*** 
A level points in 
Science 
11.994 (2.362)*** 3.868 (10.681)   -4.277 (0.983)***   -4.655 (2.523)*** 
Attend any 
university 
0.057 (0.012)*** -0.056  (0.066) -0.0195 (0.005)*** -0.0101 (0.014) 
Russell  
university 
0.083 (0.016)*** 0.125 (0.181) -0.030 (0.007)*** -0.031 (0.021) 
Independent variables: gender, Key Stage 2, maternal education and marital status, parental employment, maternal age  
  
43 
Table A5 –Results from alternative (less parsimonious) model – Impact of average peers’ ability (Key Stage 3 score) 
 Effect of peers’ average KS3 Effect of % low ability peers 
Outcomes OLS IV OLS IV 
KS3 points 1.238 (0.097)*** 0.663 (0.654) -0.421 (0.048)*** -0.323 (0.148)** 
# GCSE  
A*–C  
0.258 (0.117)** 0.454 (0.756) -0.083 (0.049)* -0.187 (0.163) 
5+ GCSE  
A*–C 
0.0395 (0.013)*** 0.151 (0.086)* -0.012 (0.006)*** -0.028 (0.018) 
Having  
A levels 
0.042 (0.013)*** 0.158 (0.089)* -0.0126 (0.005)*** -0.0301 (0.019) 
A-level  
Points 
35.959 (4.653)*** 37.054 (27.997) -15.913 (2.001)*** -16.357 (6.672)** 
A levels in 
Maths 
0.048 (0.018)*** 0.141 (0.097) -0.015 (0.007)*** -0.037 (0.022)*** 
A level points in 
Maths 
8.221 (2.396)*** 26.180 (11.312)** -2.557 (0.869)*** -5.587 (2.895)* 
A levels in 
Science 
0.068 (0.017)*** 0.115 (0.099) -0.029 (0.007)*** -0.064 (0.024)*** 
A level points in 
Science 
10.606 (2.666)*** 11.276 (16.096) -4.485 (1.078)*** -7.479 (3.752)*** 
Attend any 
university 
0.054 (0.013)**** -0.005 (0.089) -0.0175 (0.005)***  -0.001 (0.022) 
Russell  
university 
0.066 (0.019)***  0 .152 (0.111) -0.026 (0.007)** -0.046 (0.029) 
Independent variables: gender, imd score, Key Stage 2, maternal education and marital status, parental employment, maternal age, school 
characteristics (Government Office Region, religious school, total number of students), ethnicity  
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Table A6 - First stage results – Endogenous variable: average peers’ quality (KS3 score) (selected outcomes)–  
 5+  GCSE A*-C # GCSE A*-C Having A levels A level Points Attend university Russell university 
Male -0.007 (0.023) -0.007 (0.023) -0.007 (0.023) 0.014 (0.042) 0.001 (0.030) 0.025 (0.046) 
Imd score (stan.) -0.176 (0.012)*** -0.176 (0.012)*** -0.176 (0.012)*** -0.196 (0.000)*** -0.196 (0.202)*** -0.197 (0.021)*** 
KS2 score 0.140 (0.018) *** 0.140 (0.018) *** 0.140 (0.018)*** 0.183 (0.028)*** 0.163  (0.021)*** 0.177 (0.028)*** 
Maternal Uni 
degree 0.200 (0.033) *** 0.200 (0.033) *** 0.200 (0.033)*** 0.189 (0.042)*** 0.177 (0.036)*** 0.165 (0.042)*** 
Other HE qual 0.095 (0.023) *** 0.095 (0.023) *** 0.095 (0.023)*** 0.125 (0.035)*** 0.089 (0.026)*** 0.110 (0.039)*** 
Senior high 
school graduate 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.079 (0.039)*** 0.068 (0.022)*** 0.080 (0.044)*** 
Junior high 
school graduate 0.014 (0.018) 0.014 (0.018) 0.014 (0.018) 0.007 (0.030) -0.004 (0.022) -0.014 (0.037) 
Level 1 or below 0.011 (0.022) 0.011 (0.022) 0.011 (0.022) 0.013 (0.043) -0.012 (0.031) 0.001 (0.052) 
Other qual 0.040 (0.033) 0.040 (0.033) 0.040 (0.033) 0.127 (0.062)** 0.048 (0.042) 0.117 (0.076) 
Mother self-emp 0.028 (0.026) 0.028 (0.026) 0.028 (0.026) 0.020 (0.042) 0.023 (0.031) 0.067 (0.049) 
Mother unemp -0.047 (0.039) -0.047 (0.039) -0.047 (0.039) -0.077 (0.072) -0.110 (0.051)** -0.025 (0.090) 
Mother out of 
labour force -0.041 (0.016)** -0.041 (0.016)** -0.041 (0.016)*** -0.030 (0.024) -0.040 (0.020)*** -0.031 (0.029) 
Father self-emp 0.036 (0.016)** 0.036 (0.016)** 0.036 (0.016)** 0.044 (0.026)* 0.033 (0.020) -0.001 (0.030) 
Father unemp 0.016 (0.033) 0.016 (0.033) 0.016 (0.033) -0.004 (0.057) 0.047 (0.042) 0.018 (0.081) 
Father out of 
labour force -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.027) -0.015 (0.021) -0.075 (0.032)** 
Mother divorced 0.017 (0.019) 0.017 (0.019) 0.017 (0.019) 0.032 (0.040) 0.031 (0.026) 0.084 (0.044)* 
Mother widow 0.016 (0.039) 0.016 (0.039) 0.016 (0.039) 0.096 (0.059) 0.026 (0.052) -0.009 (0.079) 
Maternal age 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)* 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.002)*** 
Peers of peers 
average KS2 0.125 (0.028)*** 0.125 (0.028)*** 0.137 (0.030)*** 0.150 (0.040)*** 0.141 (0.031)*** 0.179 (0.041)*** 
F stat 20.53  20.53  20.19  14.06  20.19  18.75  
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. 




Table A7 – Results from OLS regression for the effect of other independent variables (selected outcomes)-  
 
 
KS3 Points 5+ GCSE A*-C  #GCSE A*-C Having A levels A level Points Attend university Russell university 
Male -0.302 -0.061 -0.832 -0.066 -25.008 -0.052 -0.005 
 (0.061)*** (0.008)*** (0.069)*** (0.011)*** (3.892)*** (0.012)*** (0.016) 
Imd score -0.282 -0.029 -0.131 -0.023 -2.146 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.046)*** (0.006)*** (0.053)** (0.007)*** (2.638) (0.008) (0.010) 
KS2 score 5.145 0.287 2.663 0.209 86.507 0.162 0.142 
 (0.043)*** (0.005)*** (0.037)*** (0.006)*** (3.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** 
Maternal   uni degree 1.059 0.078 0.515 0.060 17.764 -0.015 0.102 
 (0.124)*** (0.016)*** (0.129)*** (0.021)*** (6.750)*** (0.023) (0.031)*** 
Other higher education 0.452 0.025 0.170 0.028 -9.078 -0.038 -0.002 
 (0.115)*** (0.015) (0.123) (0.020) (7.197) (0.022)* (0.030) 
Senior high school grad -0.005 0.004 -0.041 -0.024 -19.152 -0.061 -0.062 
 (0.109) (0.016) (0.127) (0.020) (6.604)*** (0.022)*** (0.031)** 
Junior high school grad -0.086 -0.033 -0.314 -0.023 -24.025 -0.086 -0.109 
 (0.097) (0.012)*** (0.107)*** (0.017) (6.146)*** (0.018)*** (0.025)*** 
Level 1 or below -0.368 -0.056 -0.608 -0.096 -44.053 -0.094 -0.086 
 (0.120)*** (0.017)*** (0.147)*** (0.022)*** (9.321)*** (0.026)*** (0.034)** 
Other qualification -0.024 -0.070 -0.285 -0.014 -8.883 -0.039 -0.088 
 (0.178) (0.026)*** (0.205) (0.034) (12.110) (0.037) (0.042)** 
Mother self-employed 0.096 -0.006 -0.066 -0.015 2.947 -0.019 0.022 
 (0.119) (0.017) (0.128) (0.022) (7.430) (0.026) (0.034) 
Mother unemployed -0.369 -0.027 -0.322 -0.037 1.869 -0.045 -0.039 
 (0.252) (0.030) (0.232) (0.042) (16.116) (0.044) (0.057) 
Mother out of labour force 0.141 0.026 0.190 0.043 16.224 0.014 -0.003 
 (0.081)* (0.011)** (0.085)** (0.013)*** (5.002)*** (0.015) (0.020) 
Father self-employed -0.049 0.006 0.052 -0.002 -1.779 -0.006 0.004 
 (0.076) (0.011) (0.084) (0.015) (4.409) (0.017) (0.022) 
Father unemployed -0.173 -0.026 0.234 -0.002 4.426 -0.087 -0.011 
 (0.169) (0.023) (0.214) (0.033) (11.846) (0.033)*** (0.050) 
Father out of  labour force -0.641 -0.052 -0.733 -0.072 -20.800 -0.059 -0.030 
 (0.092)*** (0.012)*** (0.097)*** (0.015)*** (5.582)*** (0.017)*** (0.025) 
Mother is divorced -0.071 -0.025 -0.180 -0.046 -7.385 -0.033 0.018 
 (0.114) (0.015)* (0.117) (0.019)** (7.346) (0.020) (0.029) 
Mother is a widow -0.429 0.023 0.307 0.043 -2.029 -0.013 0.070 
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 (0.287) (0.031) (0.268) (0.041) (12.375) (0.045) (0.062) 
Maternal age 0.029 0.004 0.039 0.006 1.601 0.002 0.001 
 (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.345)*** (0.001) (0.002) 
N 9,213 9,213 9,213 7,098 3,948 6,309 2,734 
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. 
Results from the estimation of peer effects on A levels in Maths and Science are available on request. 
 
 
 
